Makled's Threat to the Venezuelan Regime

Fuente: Stratfor - Global Inteligenge

SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP/Getty Images
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Kiev on Oct. 18

Summary

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez issued a broadcast from the Cuban capital Nov. 8 warning that the United States was launching a massive disinformation campaign against his regime through captured drug kingpin Walid Makled. Makled, who is currently being held by Colombia and is being requested for extradition by the United States, is very valuable to Bogota and potentially to Washington given the information he allegedly possesses on money-laundering and drug-trafficking connections to senior Venezuelan government members. His fate is still undetermined but could have significant implications for Venezuelan-Colombian relations, U.S.-Colombian relations and most important, the sustainability of the Chavez regime.

Analysis

During a visit to the Cuban capital Nov. 8, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez made a speech in which he condemned the United States for trying to manipulate the case of captured drug kingpin Walid Makled. Chavez said, “The game of the empire is to offer incentives to that man (Makled), including protection, so that he can start vomiting all he wants against Venezuela and its president. Then the empire will try to manipulate all the lies that man can say.” Chavez went on to say that the United States can “pretend” to use Makled to create a list of narcotrafficking and terrorism charges against Venezuela in an international criminal court of justice, similar to the U.S. pursuit of Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega.

Makled, the man responsible for Chavez’s most recent display of anxiety, is a Lebanese-born Venezuelan national who has earned a reputation as a global drug kingpin. Upon U.S. President Barack Obama’s request, Makled was added to the U.S. list of most wanted drug traffickers in May 2009 and was arrested on Aug. 19 by Colombian police in Cucuta, Norte de Santander department.

Cause for Chavez’s Concern

Makled is believed to have worked closely with senior members of the Venezuelan government, possibly including Chavez himself, before his relationship with the regime went sour around late 2008. According to a STRATFOR source, Makled had a valuable insurance policy in dealing with the Venezuelan political and military officials, always taking care to record his interactions in case he needed to one day negotiate his way out of a prison sentence, or worse.

That day has come, and Makled is now in high demand in Bogota, Caracas and Washington. Colombia holds the keys to Makled’s fate and understands well the bargaining power it holds by keeping Makled within its jurisdiction. When Colombia and Venezuela restored diplomatic and trade relations in September, shortly after Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos took office, STRATFOR raised the question of what additional leverage Bogota might have had. The rapid rapprochement between Bogota and Caracas was not solely due to Colombia’s need to alleviate pressures on businessmen on the border who depended on trade with Venezuela for their livelihood, nor was it simply the result of a personal power struggle between Santos and his more hawkish predecessor, as many erroneously speculated (Santos and former President Alvaro Uribe Velez, in fact, have worked very closely together on Venezuela, among other issues). When STRATFOR began receiving reports of the Venezuelan military quietly shutting down Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camps and flushing FARC members back across the border into Colombia, it was evident that Bogota was holding something big over Chavez’s head.

Makled appears to be that critical factor. As STRATFOR has covered in depth, the Venezuelan regime has seen a number of its massive laundering rackets spiral out of control over recent months, leading to the gradual decay of critical state sectors including food, electricity, energy and metals. As the situation deteriorated in recent years and as the cash flow to state firms was affected more, the intersection between the money-laundering rackets and drug trafficking has grown deeper. For example, for those state entities that are running into serious cash flow problems, local drug dealers can provide local currency and filter their drug money through the exchange rate regime. The drug revenues could also be used to finance support for designated terrorist groups like FARC and the National Liberation Army. Layered on top of these relationships was Venezuela’s growing relationship with Iran and indications of increased Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force activity in Venezuela with Chavez’s approval.

Makled’s testimony, therefore, could be bought by the United States in exchange for protection, a reduced sentence or other measures in order to build up a case against the Chavez government on money-laundering, drug-trafficking and possibly terrorism charges. Indeed, district courts in Miami and New York are already building such cases against high-level Venezuelan officials, prompting Chavez to publicly warn in May that a district court in Miami could indict him and his inner circle on money-laundering and drug-trafficking charges. It would take a decision by the U.S. administration to allow these cases involving senior and active members of the regime to proceed, given the diplomatic crisis that would ensue, but holding that threat alone, along with the strong potential for intelligence sharing between Bogota and Washington over Makled, is enough to generate serious concern within the upper echelons of the regime.

Domestic Trouble Ahead for Chavez?

As the vulnerability of his government has increased, Chavez has thus placed greater emphasis on the need to rapidly expand the National Bolivarian Militia (a way to complicate any coup attempts against him while he has become increasingly beholden to external supporters like China, Cuba, Russia and Iran). Doubts over Chavez’s ability to hold onto power and concerns over whether senior political and military leaders could be sacrificed in a bargain over criminal indictments are likely to create a great deal of friction within the regime. And the more friction within the regime, the more likely the unity of the armed forces will be strained. This may explain why Chavez ally and confidante Gen. Henry Rangel Silva, Venezuela’s chief of Strategic Operational Command of the armed forces, felt the need to announce Nov. 8 that the military is “wedded” to Chavez’s political project and that the president has the armed forces’ “complete loyalty.”

Given the controversy over Makled’s capture and the other major stresses on the regime, that loyalty cannot be assured. Chavez has been pressing Bogota to extradite Makled to Venezuela — an act that could lead to Makled’s demise or disappearance. The United States is also bargaining for Makled’s extradition; a New York Federal Court formally indicted Makled on Nov. 4. When Santos traveled to Caracas to meet with Chavez on Nov. 3, the Venezuelan president urged his Colombian counterpart to hand Makled over (he has been asking for his extradition since September). Santos failed to give him any assurances, leading Chavez and Rangel Silva to warn Nov. 8 that the United States was working to wreck the Colombian-Venezuelan rapprochement.

The issue of Makled’s extradition is likely factoring into Colombia’s current dealings with the United States over the status of their relationship, including how to proceed with an expanded military basing agreement. The agreement is in political limbo after Colombia’s Constitutional Court declared it unconstitutional because it was signed under Uribe without congressional approval, though U.S. forces in the area appear to be operating with little disruption. Though Colombia remains interested in maintaining a close defense relationship with the United States, it is also looking for a more equitable partnership with Washington — one that will entail technology-sharing rights and free trade concessions. These broader negotiations are still under way, and the Makled extradition is one more bargaining chip at Bogota’s disposal as the United States looks to Colombia as its main military foothold in South America.

As of now, there is no clear answer as to what will become of Makled. There is no doubt, however, that he is a prize for Bogota and Washington, and his testimony could pose a significant threat to the sustainability of the Chavez regime.